It is axiomatic that the climate impacts documented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change are likely to undermine the realisation of a range of protected human rights. Yet it is only in the recent past that an explicit human rights approach has been brought to bear on the climate change problem. Scholars and human rights bodies have begun to advocate a human rights-centred approach to climate change-an approach which would place the individual at the centre of inquiry, and draw attention to the impact that climate change could have on human rights protection. This article focuses on the human rights claims raised in the climate negotiations, the implications these claims may have and the interests they may serve. The article argues that human rights approaches, taken in their entirety, have the potential to bring much needed attention to individual welfare as well as to provide ethical moorings in inter-governmental climate negotiations currently characterised by self-interested deal-seeking. Human rights approaches provide
Introduction
In the two decades since it first appeared on the international agenda, 1 climate change has progressed from an issue of marginal significance to one of central importance to the future of humanity. 2 The global average temperature has increased by 0.748C in the last century, the largest and fastest warming trend in the history of the Earth. 3 It is predicted to increase by around 1.8 to 6.48C by the end of the 21st century. 4 In addition to other impacts, climate change will likely increase the severity of droughts, land degradation and desertification, the intensity of floods and tropical cyclones, and the incidence of malaria and heat-related mortality, and decrease crop yield and food security. 5 There is also increasing certainty that, as the climate system warms, poorer nations, and the poorest within them, will be the worst affected. 6 Moreover, climate change is 'a massive threat to human development '. 7 Notwithstanding the magnitude of the problem and the years that the international community has spent engaging on this issue, an effective and universal solution to address it has thus far proved elusive. has predicted that extreme weather events will become more frequent, more intense and more widespread through the 21st century and, that intense tropical cyclone activity, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events are likely or very likely to increase. 17 These weather events increase the risk of mortality (especially for the elderly, chronically sick, very young and the socially isolated), injuries and infections. 18 To take another example, the right to the highest attainable standard of health is considered indispensable for the enjoyment of other human rights, 19 And it is widely protected in international and regional instruments, and under national constitutions. The right to health has been broadly defined as an 'inclusive right' including timely and appropriate health care, access to safe and potable water, adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions and access to health-related education and information. 20 These are considered the basic determinants of health, and as the World Health Organization (WHO) reports, climate change will place these basic determinants at risk. 21 Yet it is only in the recent past that an explicit human rights approach has been brought to bear on the climate change problem. 22 In the early days of the negotiations, in particular in the context of the FCCC, developing countries sought to introduce and privilege the right to development in the text. More recently, some countries and interest groups have sought to widen the range of human rights of relevance in the climate negotiations. Scholars and human rights bodies have gone further and advocated a human rights-centred approach to climate change. Such an approach would place the individual at the centre of inquiry and therefore draw attention to the impact that climate change could have on the realisation of a range of human rights.
This article is focused on the human rights claims raised in the climate negotiations, the implications these claims may have and the interests they may serve. The article begins by examining the references or lack thereof to human rights in the climate change treaties, and then documents the human rights-based interventions and submissions made by Parties in the ongoing climate change negotiations. It then steps back to analyse, in an initial and contingent fashion, the role and relevance of a human rights approach to climate change. In doing this, the article identifies two principal approaches to bringing human rights to bear on climate protection. First, climate protection could be brought within the context of the existing human right in relation to the environment, howsoever defined, litigated in several national and international fora, and thus enforced in discrete cases. Second, a human rights optic could be applied to climate impacts. The latter is a less concrete yet more ambitious approach in that it seeks a reframing of the climate problem that would provide nations with a 'compass for policy orientation' and draw them towards ever more stringent actions. The focus in the latter is on the broader range of human rights placed at risk by the impacts of climate change and the ethical pull this might create, rather than exclusively on a human right in relation to the environment and the litigation possibilities that might flow from it. This article touches on the former in so far as it complements the latter but focuses on the latter as it arguably has more radical potential.
The article argues that human rights approaches, taken in their entirety, have the potential to bring much needed attention to individual welfare as well as to provide ethical moorings in inter-governmental climate negotiations currently characterised by self-interested deal-seeking. Human rights approaches provide benchmarks against which states'actions can be evaluated and they offer the possibility of holding authorities to account. Human rights approaches may also offer additional criteria for the interpretation of applicable principles and obligations that states have to each other, to their own citizens, and to the citizens of other states in relation to climate change. This article seeks to provide some preliminary insights into the ways in which rights-based interpretations of applicable principles and obligations may serve to influence some of the current debates in the climate negotiations.
Righting the Framework Convention on Climate Change
Since the early days of negotiations on climate change, many developing countries have advanced an equity perspective on climate changeça perspective which is underpinned by human rights concerns. The crux of their argument rests on an appreciation of differences between countriesçdifferences in contributions to the carbon stock and flow in the atmosphere (historical versus current and future), nature of emissions (survival versus luxury), economic status (poverty versus wealth) 23 and physical impacts, including their ability 23 As an early influential paper written by developing country activists asks '[c]an we really equate the carbon dioxide guzzling automobiles in Europe and North America or, for that matter, anywhere in the Third World with the methane emissions of draught cattle and rice fields of subsistence farmers in West Bengal or Thailand? Do these people not have a right to to cope with them (severe versus adaptable). In their view, these differences in contributions to carbon stock, nature of emissions and economic status suggest that developing countries should only be expected to contribute to solving the problem, to the extent that they are enabled and supported to do so. 24 It is in this context that these developing countries advance their right to development.
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Whilst the FCCC does not endorse an explicit 'right' to development, disputed as it is, 26 it does recognise the central role that development plays in the climate change regime. FCCC Article 2 (Objective) specifies that stabilisation of green house gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere must be achieved within a time frame sufficient to 'enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner'. The FCCC also recognises that in the pursuit of social and economic development, emissions and energy consumption in developing countries will grow. 27 This, read in conjunction with the global stabilisation goal in Article 2, arguably suggests that the climate regime envisions a redistribution of the ecological space, with industrial countries reducing their emissions to make room for developing countries to grow. 28 It could be further argued that such redistribution stems from a recognition that developing countries, and by extension their citizens, are entitled to an appropriate proportion of the ecological space so as to achieve and sustain a certain (the right to development/ sustainable development was highlighted in the submissions by, among others, Philippines, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, India, Chile, China, Ecuador, Ghana, G-77/China, in the context of 'principles for a shared vision'). 26 The right to development is deeply disputed. The disagreements (broadly between developing and some developed countries) relate to the definition and scope of the term right to development, the correlative duty this right entails, and the subjects to which this right attaches. The United States, in particular, has consistently rejected the notion of a 'right' to development. In 1986, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development, the United States cast a negative vote, and a few European countries abstained. At Rio, the US entered an interpretative statement to Principle 3 (right to development) which reads, '[t]he United States does not, by joining consensus on the Rio Declaration, change its long-standing opposition to the so-called 'right to development. ' Development is not a right. On the contrary, development is a goal we all hold, which depends for its realization in large part on the promotion and protection of the human rights set out in the 31 and the Greenhouse Development Rights framework (based on the right of all people to reach a dignified level of sustainable human development), 32 all draw on the equity-based right to development. In the climate context, although not typically labelled as such, the right to development takes within its fold the right to emit. The desire to occupy a larger share of the ecological space, and an entitlement to it, is a legitimate one. For in the words of Wolfgang Sachs, '[e]missions not only produce the burden of marginalization they also produce the benefit of power, and the right to use the atmosphere as a dumping ground represents a source of economic power. Disparity in access leads to disparity in economic opportunities. It partitions the world into winners and losers'. 33 It is this, for instance, that inspires India's position on climate change. India has committed that its per capita emissions will not exceed the levels of developed countries. 34 India's per capita emissions are 1.2 metric tons, while the OECD average is 13.2. 35 If industrialised countries lower their per capita emissions to 4 metric tons, India would be committed to remaining at or below it. The USA, for instance, aspires to lower its emissions 80% by 2050. It is currently at 20 metric tons per capita. At 2050, if it meets its mitigation aspiration, it will be at 4 tons per capita, and India would be committed to staying below that. This both ties India's commitment to that of OECD countries, as well as seeks an equitable redistribution of the ecological space. To the extent that these positions are per capita assessments, they are in essence taking an anthropocentric rights-based approach to the issue of climate change.
The exercise of a right to development, to the extent it is recognised and protected in the FCCC, is not unfettered. Developing countries are required under the climate regime to develop in a sustainable manner 36 doing so to address the adverse effects of climate change through adaptation. This is, however, a responsibility unique to developing countries in the sense that it requires them to take on board sustainable development at a period in the trajectory of their developmentça comparable period in which the industrial countries had no such restraints on their development. 37 Although fettered, the exercise of such a right to develop will result in greater GHG emissions.
Recent Efforts to Link Human Rights and Climate Change
Much of the recent interest in the human rights dimensions of climate change has been sparked by the plight of the Inuit 38 and the Small Island States, at the frontlines of climate change. In their 2005 petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inuit claimed that the impacts of climate change, caused by acts and omissions of the United States, violated their fundamental human rightsçin particular the rights to the benefits of culture, to property, to the preservation of health, life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to residence, movement, and inviolability of the home. 39 These rights, they argued, were protected under several international human rights instruments, including the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 40 The Commission refused to review the merits of the petition on the grounds that the information provided did not enable them to determine whether there was a violation of the rights protected by the American Declaration. 41 Although the Inuit Petition did not fare well before the Commission, it drew attention to the links between climate change and human rights, and led to a 'Hearing of a General Nature' on human rights and global warming. 42 The Hearing was held on 1 March 2007, and featured 37 The IPCC noted that 'the level of energy intensities in developing countries today is generally comparable with the range of the now-industrialised countries when they had the same level of per capita GDP'. See 43 However, it was not intended to achieve any concrete outcome and consequently no such outcome ensued. 44 In the climate negotiations, indigenous groups more generally have delivered strong statements on the impacts of climate change on indigenous peoples' health, society, culture and well-being. 45 Indigenous peoples' organisations have been admitted to the Convention process as NGOs, with constituency status. 46 The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at its second session recommended the establishment of an ad hoc open-ended working group on indigenous peoples and climate change 47 çthis, however, did not come to pass. 48 In its seventh session, in April^May 2008, dedicated to climate change, the Forum recommended that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples serve as a 'key and binding framework' in efforts to curb climate change, and that the human rights-based approach guide the design and implementation of local, national, regional and global climate policies and projects. 49 The Bolivia argues that the scientific basis for a climate regime must include a full analysis of social, economic and environmental conditions (including the right to water, the protection of human rights, poverty eradication, etc) in developing countries. 60 And, Argentina raises human rights in the context of 'enhanced action on adaptation' arguing that further research on the impacts of climate change on human rights realisation, 'will be useful in ensuring that climate response takes place within a strong sustainable development framework'. 61 These countries do not offer specific suggestions for integrating human rights approaches into the negotiations. Adaptation projects, such as infrastructure development initiatives on community lands, have the potential, unless appropriately designed, to adversely impact the rights of local communities and indigenous peoples in relation to these lands. 63 Ibid 31 [109] ^ [110] . Internationally designed forest policies implemented in a top-down fashion have the potential, unless appropriately designed, to adversely impact the rights of local communities and indigenous people in relation to participatory decision-making and benefit-sharing. proposed the inclusion of various rights in the negotiating text on 'shared vision', in particular the right to development and the right to live well. These were opposed by most developed countries who did not wish to refer in the climate texts to rights that were either not recognised in human rights treaties (such as the right to live well) or were disputed (such as the right to development). 68 The Copenhagen conference resulted in decisions to continue negotiations under the FCCC 69 and Kyoto Protocol, 70 and the controversial Copenhagen Accord reached among a subset of the Parties to the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol. 71 States were tasked with continuing on the basis of the work that had been undertaken thus far. 72 Among the texts forwarded for further work is an overarching draft COP decision which contains several references to human rights. It 'note[s]' resolution 10/4 of the United Nations Human Rights Council is 'mindful' that 'the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the full enjoyment of human rights, including living well' and it 'recogniz[es] the right of all nations to survival'. 73 A forwarded draft decision on reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries also contains a reference to the need to respect the knowledge and 'rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities'. 74 In April 2010, Bolivia held a World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, Bolivia, with an estimated participation of 35,000 people from social movements and organisations from 140 countries. Bolivia submitted the outcome of this Conference to the FCCC process. This Bolivian submission is by far the most comprehensive exposition on rights to be submitted to the FCCC process. In a submission liberally peppered with rights language, Bolivia seeks to introduce into the post-2012 negotiations the rights of developing countries (inter alia to 'equitable sharing of atmospheric space' and to development), rights of all peoples including migrants (inter alia to life, food, housing, health, access to water and to be protected from the adverse impacts of climate change), rights of indigenous peoples (inter alia to consultation, participation and prior, free and informed consent) and intriguingly to the rights of 'Mother Earth' (inter alia to live, to be respected, to regenerate its bio-capacity and to integral health). 75 The rights that the Bolivian submission refers to can be divided into: rights recognised elsewhere in human rights instruments; rights recognised elsewhere but whose nature, content and extent are disputed; and rights that are yet to be recognised. Most of the rights Bolivia highlights in its submission fall into the first category. The rights of indigenous people and the references to the 'UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other instruments' 76 are examples. Among the rights in the second category is the 'right to development' expressed in the climate context in a right derived from itça right to 'the equitable sharing of atmospheric space'. 77 In so far as the right to development is disputed, its reiteration and referencing in the climate process, should this come to pass, would lend it considerable weight. In the third category of rights are the rights of Mother Earth, a novel attempt to fashion eco-centric rights. In an annex to its submission, Bolivia included a draft 'Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth', which it suggests be adopted by the General Assembly as a 'common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations of the world'. 78 The intended locus of action is the General Assembly not the FCCC process, and the rights of Mother Earth are not limited or related to climate-specific impacts but to environmental harms more generally. 79 The Bolivian submission signals a desire to press for a range of rights recognised and protected in human rights instrumentsçalbeit of varying levels of acceptance, normativity, legal weight and enforceabilityçto be taken into account in the negotiation and implementation of the climate regime. Notwithstanding the liberal deployment of rights language, it is less clear that they hope to create substantive climate-specific rights in the post-2012 climate regime. Moreover, it is unlikely that they will be able to. Submissions such as the Bolivian one are not likely to or even perhaps designed to create substantive climate-specific rights. The legal form of the post-2012 agreement is as yet uncertain. The Bali Action Plan, which launched the process towards an 'agreed outcome' in Copenhagen, left the legal form as well as the ambition of that outcome uncertain. 80 Options include a legally binding instrument either to supplement the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol, or to replace the Kyoto Protocol; an amendment or set of amendments to the FCCC including the Annexes, or by adding Annex/es; a single COP decision or a set of COP decisions to further implement the FCCC; a Ministerial Declaration containing the elements of the political agreement; and any combination or package of the above.
81 COP-15 extended the deadline, and with it the uncertainty on legal form. Most Party suggestions for rights references find their way into 'preambular text', as they did, for instance, in the overarching decision text forwarded from COP-15.
82 Preambular references can add colour, texture and context to an agreement but cannot create substantive rights and obligations. To the extent that rights references are incorporated into operational text, the entire text may well be nothing more than COP decision text, which, except in defined contexts, is not legally binding, and cannot act as a vehicle to create substantive new obligations for Parties. 83 Finally, it is also worth bearing in mind that Bolivia, and the ALBA states, whilst not without influence and friends, are outliers in the post-2012 negotiations. They seek a radical restructuring of the international legal order, 84 of which the climate negotiations is just one part. 91 The text on 'shared vision' contains an option, inspired by the ALBA submissions, that obliges Parties, in all climate-related actions, to ensure full respect for human rights, as well as to recognise and defend the rights of Mother Earth. 92 The text on the 'global goal' includes a reference to the right to life, 93 and the text on adaptation requires Parties to undertake actions in accordance, inter alia, with relevant international human rights instruments. 94 There are also references to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 95 and safeguards for indigenous peoples both in the context of REDD activities as well as in designing response measures to climate change. Parties are required to obtain free, prior and informed consent from indigenous peoples before adopting and implementing measures that may affect them. 96 Needless to say the negotiating text is much bracketed, signifying disagreement amongst Parties on these and other issues. 
Rights-Based Perspectives on Climate Change Negotiations
Most climate negotiators consider the human rights approaches valuable insofar as they present a useful complement to the intergovernmental climate process. Within the process itself, many negotiators are sceptical of the utility of a human rights approach, given the complex and laden agenda of the negotiations, the limited space nearly two decades into the negotiations for new methodological or conceptual approaches, and the reluctance to import the many differences among states on human rights issues into the climate negotiations. A glimpse into these differences are in evidence in the discussions on shared vision, where ALBA countries advocate ethically anchored expansive notions of rights, including of Mother Earth, and many developed countries, including the United States, offer vigorous resistance on formal legal grounds.
For a human rights approach to be effective, rights cannot simply be layered on, as yet another preambular recital; they would need to be integrated and mainstreamed. Existing treaties would need to be reinterpreted in a fashion not envisaged at the time when they were negotiated, and the post-2012 negotiations would need to take these into account. The existing treaties are primarily concerned with inter-state burden sharing for a global environmental problem. They are not rights-focused. Any attempt, some believe, to reinterpret them in a rights-focused manner would of necessity be contrived. The role that human rights approaches could play in this context would have to be carefully tailored to the needs and constraints of the climate regime.
The Role and Relevance of a Human Rights Approach to Climate Protection
There are at least two approaches to bringing human rights to bear on climate protection. First, climate protection could be brought within the context of the existing human right in relation to the environment, litigated in several national and international fora, and thus enforced in discrete cases. Second, a human rights optic could be applied to climate impacts. The latter is by far the less concrete yet more ambitious approach in that it seeks a reframing of the climate problem which would draw nations towards ever more stringent actions. In the latter, the value-laden language and rhetoric of human rights is pressed into service to stress the urgency of climate change and to catalyse multilateral action on it. It is this endeavour in which some Parties in the climate negotiations are engaged. However, the scope and limits of the former are also worth exploring briefly so as to illustrate the ways in which these two approaches might inform and complement each other.
Extending the Human Right in Relation to the Environment to Climate Protection
The multilateral environmental dialogue, in its anthropocentricity, 97 has always held the human being firmly at its centre, but it is only in the last few decades that environmental protection, which by logical extension encompasses climate protection, has been articulated in the language of human rights. Several international soft law instruments 98 and numerous treaties recognise and protect environmental rights whether procedural, 99 derivative 100 or stand-alone 101 ones. In addition, more than a hundred national constitutions 102 recognise an environmental right. Indeed, the Ksentini Report, commissioned by the UN Sub Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, records 'universal acceptance' of environmental rights at the national, regional and international level. 103 Only a handful of these international treaties recognise a stand-alone or explicit human right in relation to the environment. 104 The African Charter is one such. 105 The African Commission on Human and People's Rights has found Nigeria in violation of the right to life, health, food, property, and to a healthy environment in the case concerning Shell and the Ogoni People. 106 And, more recently, the African Commission found Kenya in violation of the rights to freedom of religion, property, health, culture, religion, natural resources and, intriguingly, the right to development in the case concerning the Endorois Peoples. 107 Even in the absence of an explicit human right in relation to the environment, international judicial fora, such as the European Court of Human Rights, have increasingly recognised that environmental harms lead to human rights violations. 108 Such recognition is not evidence of the evolution of a distinctive autonomous right to a healthy environment (which is mired in controversy) but quite simply an emerging understanding that environmental harms impact human rights, such as the right to respect for private and family life, health and even the right to life. 109 The European Court of Human Rights starting with its landmark judgment in Lopez Ostra 110 has held that 'severe environmental pollution may affect individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely'. 111 The Court in Lopez Ostra did not consider the absence of a specific right to a healthy environment a bar to considering environmental cases. 112 In the series of cases that followed Lopez Ostra, 113 the European Court's recognition that severe environmental pollution may affect an individual's well being and impact their rights, became evident. The Court is clear, however, that such environmental harm must impact a person's enjoyment of a protected right. As the Court stressed in Kyrtatos v Greece, 'the crucial element which must be present. . . is the existence of a harmful effect on a person's private or family sphere and not simply the general deterioration of the environment'. The Court went on to say that '[n]either Article 8 nor any of the other Articles of the Convention are specifically designed to provide general protection of the environment as such; to that effect, other international instruments and domestic legislation are more pertinent in dealing with this particular aspect'. 114 The UN Human Rights Committee 115 as well as the Inter-American
Commission and Court on Human Rights also consider cases based on environmental harms in the absence of specific environmental rights 116 çhowever, not without dispute. In an admissibility hearing in the recent case of Mossville Environmental Action Now v United States before the Inter-American Commission, the USA argued that there is 'no such right as the right to a healthy environment, either directly, or as a component of the rights to life, health, privacy and inviolability of the home, or equal protection and freedom from discrimination'. 117 The USA also argued that even if one were to assert that customary international law existed on the topic, the USA should be considered a 'persistent objector' to it. 118 Notwithstanding widespread recognition that environmental harms impact human rights, an explicit human right in relation to the environmentçits scope, content, and justiciability, as well as the wisdom of pursuing a human rights path to environmental protectionçremains controversial. 119 The scope and content of a human right in relation to the environment is by its very nature indeterminate. It raises more questions than it answers. First, to what qualitative level should the environment be protectedçclean, safe, healthy, decent or satisfactory? 120 Fifth, to what extent should these rights be justiciable? These queries are yet to be authoritatively considered and resolved. In addition to these pragmatic difficulties in conceptualising a workable human right in relation to the environment, is the ethical concern that a human rights focus to environmental protection may be excessively anthropocentric, and not accord due consideration to the intrinsic value of the environment, 123 as for instance, the many species that are likely to face extinction as a result of global warming. Given these numerous uncertainties and complexities in fashioning and implementing a workable human right in relation to the environment, the role that such a right can directly play in providing a steer to the climate negotiations and post-2012 regime is limited. To the extent that climate litigation, based on a human right in relation to the environment, however, gains ground in national and regional fora, it can serve to shape Parties' positions in the climate negotiations.
Applying a Human Rights Lens to Climate Protection
The second approach to bringing human rights to bear on climate protection is by applying a broader human rights lens to analyse and address climate change. There are two elements to this approach. First, the focus is on those human rights that are not in dispute such as the rights to life, liberty and security, and the right to an adequate standard of living (of which health, and shelter are a part). 124 It is not restricted to a human right in relation to the 124 The existence of these rights is not in dispute; however, there is neither a widely accepted list of which rights constitute 'core rights' nor an agreement on whether, to the extent that they environment, a right some are not persuaded by, and which is vulnerable to the challenge of anthropocentricism. Second, this approach rests on a broader ethical conception of human rights rather than solely on a legal construction of them. A host of internationally protected rightsçin particular the rights to life, liberty and security, and the right to an adequate standard of living çand progressive realisation towards them will be at risk from climate impacts. There is a burgeoning and ever-persuasive literature arguing the case. 125 The vast majority of nations have signed the core human rights treaties, including the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 126 State Parties have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the rights contained in these treaties, each of these requiring different degrees of state intervention. 127 These obligations are binding on every state Party, 128 and must be given effect to in good faith. 129 And, indeed, once a state has ratified the ICCPR, it is not permitted to denounce or withdraw from it. 130 It is worth noting that although several rights likely to be placed at risk from climate impacts fall in the category of economic, social and cultural rights, they are nonetheless salient. The notion of interdependence and indivisibility exist, they should be drawn from civil and political rights alone or extend to economic and social rights as well. The notion of core rights also flies in the face of the indivisibility thesis. However influential scholars such as Shue argue from first principles that there are some 'basic rights' that cut across the divide between civil and political rights and economic and social rights, and extend to negative and positive aspects of these rights. Shue argues for an open-ended category of basic rights that includes in the first instance the rights to physical security, subsistence and political participation. See H Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence,of all human rights is central to human rights jurisprudence. 131 The Human Rights Committee has noted that a distinction between the two sets of rights with respect to the provision of legal remedies cannot be maintained. 132 This position is also endorsed by several influential scholars who believe that evolving notions of political responsibility place considerable strain on rigid distinctions between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, as also between negative and positive obligations 133 The extent of application and enforcement of protected human rights will, of necessity, differ from state to state depending on national circumstances, constitutional culture, legislative proclivity, judicial creativity and governance mechanisms, but at a minimum, the core human rights treaties set standards and benchmarks in place, and impose process obligationsçobligations to integrate human rights concerns into policy planning.
Most of the Parties to the core human rights treaties are also Party to the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 134 States, at least those that are Party to both the climate treaties and the human rights treaties (this includes the vast majority), are obliged to approach the climate change problem not just as a global environmental problem, but also as a human rights concern. States are obliged to identify and explore the human rights that might be placed at risk by climate impacts, and take pre-emptive action in that regard. They are also obliged to design policies and measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, sensitive to the impacts that these could have on the progressive realisation of protected human rights. Admittedly, the language of obligations in the absence of mechanisms for oversight and enforcement may be of limited use. However, to the extent that Parties' recognise the existence of such obligations, their positions in the climate negotiations should be tailored to and informed by them.
In the interests of coherence, it would be advisable for states to take their obligations under human rights treaties into account in designing the post-2012 climate regime. If they do not, the performance of obligations under the regime may be inconsistent with, interfere or impact the performance of obligations under certain human rights treaties. To take an example, there are discussions underway in the climate negotiations on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). In designing policy approaches and framing positive incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation it is important to take into account the recognition, protection and specific dimensions of the rights of indigenous peoples and communities under human rights treaties. 135 The latest iteration of the negotiating text contains such protections in bracketed text. 136 In addition to the obligations that can be said to flow from a legal construction of human rights, an ethical conception of human rights can also lend considerable value to the climate change debate. The international human rights discourse is premised on the notion of universality, 137 the notion that universally valid rights are located 'beyond law and history', 138 and their protection transcends cultural, social, religious, economic and political context. As such the institution of human rights combines 'law and morality, description and prescription'. 139 This has the potential, as Douzinas argues, to lead to 'confusion and rhetorical exaggeration'. 140 However, such confusion can be limited as long as a conceptual distinction is maintained between legal and moral human rights. The content of legal human rights is dependent on the legislative, judicial, and executive bodies that maintain and interpret the laws in question. 141 The validity of moral human rights on the other hand is independent of such governmental bodies, and it is indeed respect for moral human rights that imparts legitimacy to the acts of governmental bodies.
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While legal human rights derive their legitimacy from consent-based sources of international law such as human rights treaties, moral human rights derive their validity and rhetorical force primarily from natural law, and only secondarily from consent-based sources of international law. 143 The recognition of moral human rights is significant because it creates the space for a critical assessment of existing international law, free from the narrow formalistic confines of consent-based renderings of international law. The recognition of moral human rights may also serve as a catalyst to the legalisation of these rights. It is worth noting in this context that as international lawyers begin to engage with issues such as climate change and human rights, a tension will likely emerge between the formalistic consent-based renderings of international law and critical, ethically anchored revisionist renderings of international law, and this tension needs to be acknowledged and accommodated. The efforts of ALBA countries to tailor the post-2012 climate regime to fit their alternative eco-centric rights-based and socialistic vision expose such a tension.
Given the complexity of the ongoing negotiation process, and the marginal buy-in from states of human rights approaches in the context of the intergovernmental climate process, what space can a human rights approach constructively occupy, and what role can it creatively play? The ICHRP report suggests that human rights offers 'a shared and codified moral language around which consensus can be built'. 144 Elsewhere the report notes that human rights language can add 'considerable normative traction to arguments in favour of strong mitigation and adaptation' 145 and that 'human rights provide a legitimate set of guiding principles for global policy because they are widely accepted by societies and governments everywhere'. 146 This argument is premised on the notion that the institution of human rights offers a universally shared value system. The conscience-affirming but self-denying actions that tackling climate change will require can only occur if it is predicated on and spurred by a powerful value system. This is an intuitively persuasive argument, in particular if viewed in conjunction with the Argentinean suggestion that a human rights approach could 'provide us with a compass for policy orientation '. 147 But where does this compass lead us? And, in what sorts of disputes might this approach provide a mediating influence?
A normative focus on the individual
The primary defining feature of a human rights approach is its normative focus on the individualçin other words 'in the dignity and worth of the human person'. 148 A focus on the dignity and worth of every individual renders efforts to deal-seek for the majority problematic. And it is this that states in the climate negotiations are essentially engaged inçdeal-seeking for perceived aggregate welfare which may well be incompatible with individual rights for particular people or groups of people. The primary objective of the climate regime is the 'stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. 149 This object is found in Article 2 of the FCCC and reference 153 The Copenhagen Accord agreed to limit temperature increase to below 28C (some increase being inevitable). But even a 28C temperature increase will have significant impacts on the inhabitants of small island states and the Arctic Inuit. 154 It appears then that the costs (to the global community) of limiting climate change to below 28C must have been deemed to outweigh the benefits it will bring to a small (in proportion) number of people. A focus on individual rights would make such determinations of aggregate welfare questionable, for the '[l]anguage of rights strengthens the power of the marginalized'.
155 This is not to suggest that human rights of particular individuals are determinative in such an instance, and that the regime should be structured around a negligible temperature increase. It is conceivable that the costs, economic and opportunity, and the corresponding rights implications, may be prohibitive for the rest of the world, for other people and other rights. And, human rights are not absoluteças evidenced by the fact that economic and social rights are to be 'progressively realized' and even some civil and political rights can be derogated from in emergencies. 156 Human rights approaches in such situations would shift focus to the correlative duties of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for the affected individuals. It is worth noting that the small island states have proposed stabilisation of GHG concentrations well below 350ppm CO 2 eq, temperature increases limited to well below 1.58C above the pre-industrial level, and reduction of CO 2 emissions by greater than 85% by 2050. mechanism to address social, economic and environmental loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in vulnerable developing countries through risk management, insurance, compensation and rehabilitation. The focus on individual rights, however, offers little guidance in situations where rights seemingly conflict, as they often do. To take a paradigmatic case, in India where 44% of its population (approximately 500 million) does not have access to electricity, provision of energy to all will result in rapid increases in GHGs. Such increases could result, directly or indirectly, in the loss of the island of Tuvalu. The rights of 500 million Indians to an adequate standard of living, to development (and access to energy) conflict with the rights of 12,000 Tuvaluans to their culture, property and territorial integrity. On what principled basis can one decide the rights and people that trump the others? Or is it possible (and indeed necessary) for both to subsist? Political philosopher Caney argues that since in such a paradigmatic case both sets of rights relate to vital interests (of sufficient weight to impose obligations on others), it should be possible to satisfy both. 160 There are many fossil-fuel intensive climate endangering activities in other (primarily industrialised) parts of the world that relate to 'relatively trivial interests', and these must be cut back 161 so as to create space for increased GHG emissions for individuals without access to electricity, as well as to protect the territorial integrity, and cultural rights of the small islanders. Two aspects of this argument are interesting: first, it finds resonance in the climate regime which is fundamentally premised, as argued before, on a redistribution of the ecological space. And, second, it distinguishes between trivial and non-trivial interests that may be served by climate endangering activities. This distinction has a long history in the climate negotiations, where India and China have consistently argued that developing country emissions are 'survival emissions' while industrialised country emissions are 'lifestyle' or 'luxury' emissions. 162 Human rights protect the former not the latter. They provide benchmarksç'moral thresholds' 163 or 'line[s] beneath which no one is allowed to sink' 164 against which actions can be evaluated. In this sense there is a synergy, notwithstanding differences in methodology, between human rights approaches and the climate change discourse.
Holding authorities to account
Another defining feature of human rights approaches is their power, given the necessary implication of obligations or duties, to hold authorities, even at times across territorial lines, to account. 165 It is the enforcement potential of human rights approaches, given the glacial pace and distant promise of the climate negotiations, that first captured the legal imagination. A series of cases have been filed in national 166 and international 167 fora seeking recompense for climate damage. Few of these cases have resulted in clear victories. The Inuit case, the most high profile of its kind, was held inadmissible. Although the Commission did not offer detailed reasons for its decision, they are not hard to fathom. There are serious hurdles in terms of establishing clear and binding obligations (given the contextual and soft language used in the relevant treaties), jurisdiction (since states, on occasion, do not recognise the jurisdiction of various international dispute settlement fora), standing (as every state both contributes to and suffers the impacts of climate change), causation (between the GHG emissions of the defendant state, current and historic, and impacts suffered by the plaintiff state/individuals), and damage (as much of it may be future damage). Indeed, the climate change problem exposes the fault lines and limits of international law. 168 National level human rights^climate change litigation has fared better. In the Nigerian Gas Flaring Case 169 the Court held that the practice of gas flaring by Nigeria in the Niger Delta, a practice which contributed more to climate change than all other sources in Sub-Saharan Africa, violated guaranteed constitutional rights to life and dignity. 170 It is worth noting, however, that whatever the Rights-Based Perspectives on Climate Change Negotiationsoutcome of human rights-based climate litigation, the act of filing of these cases itself has considerable rhetorical and practical impact. As some scholars note, the focus on specific injuries builds political support, and the 'story-telling quality' of the cases makes climate change real and tangible. 171 And, even if individual cases fail, they indirectly build pressure for policy and legislative action. 172 The power to hold authorities to account in the human rights arena is more than a legal conceptçin other words, it is more than the power to enforce in dispute settlement fora. In sync with the 'moral human rights' notion raised earlier, the 2000 Human Development Report characterises human rights as 'moral claims on the behaviour of individual and collective agents, and on the design of social arrangements'. 173 People have legitimate claims on others and on the design of social arrangements 'regardless of what laws happen to be enforced'. 174 These sorts of claims and this fluid notion of accountability render certain national positions in the climate negotiations suspect. For instance, India, among other developing countries, often argues that 'India is certainly not responsible for the mess. We are, in fact, victims of it. So why expect us to tighten our belts?' 175 While it is true that India is not (either solely or primarily) responsible for the 'mess' and that it is, amongst others, a victim of it, the legitimate human rights claims of those who suffer the ill effects of climate change within Indiaçalong the coastline, in the Sundarbans, and in the rural areas 176 çdemand that the government give account of itself and that it takes adaptation and mitigation concerns seriously. And whether it accepts mitigation targets internationally or not, it still has human rights obligations to its people, both under international and national constitutional law.
Open to a similar critique is the position of the USA. The USA refused to adopt GHG targets under Kyoto since the Protocol 'exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the U.S. economy'. The USA continues to deploy this argument in the post-2012 negotiations to ensure its mitigation obligations are comparable to those for developing countries in legal character even if not in stringency. 178 Needless to say, no nation is obliged to sign a treaty. It is true that China and India do not have quantitative mitigation targets under the Kyoto Protocol, and this may be a justifiable reason for the USA to reject the Protocol. But this is not a sufficient reason for the USA to shy away from stringent action on mitigation and adaptation. The standards required of other nations may be appropriate considerations in the context of a deal-seeking utilitarian intergovernmental negotiation, but not in the context of a human rights approach. A human rights optic renders the requirements (or lack thereof) placed on India and China irrelevant in determining whether the USA has a duty to take stringent action to avert and adapt to climate change domestically. The USA can be held to account (even if only in the court of public opinion) irrespective of the action or inaction of any other nation.
The Interpretative Implications of Human Rights Approaches to Climate Change
If a broader human rights approach to climate change has much to recommend itself, and the preceding sections suggest that it does, before applying this approach, it is worth exploring the ways in which a human rights approach may shape our understanding and influence our interpretations of relevant principles and obligations as they apply between states, within states, and between states and those subject to another's jurisdiction.
Between States Inter Se
Does a human rights optic demand a certain 'code of conduct' between states in the manner in which issues such as climate change, with such serious and inequitably distributed human rights implications, are resolved? The 'code of conduct' between states in addressing climate change is guided principally by a set of principles contained in the FCCC. To what extent or in what ways would a human rights optic alter currently accepted interpretations of these principles?
6.1.1. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
The first and arguably foremost principle governing the code of conduct is the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR). 179 The CBDR principle brings together several strands of thought. First, it establishes unequivocally the common responsibility of states for the protection of the global environment. Next, it builds on the acknowledgement by industrial countries that they bear the primary responsibility for creating the global environmental problem by taking into account the contributions of states to environmental degradation in determining their levels of responsibility under the regime. In doing so it recognises broad distinctions between states, whether on the basis of economic development or consumption levels.
The core content of the CBDR principle as well as the nature of the obligation it entails is deeply contested. Both at the negotiations, and in the scholarly literature, there are at least two incompatible views on its content: one, that the CBDR principle 'is based on the differences that exist with regard to the level of economic development;' 180 alternatively, the CBDR principle is based on 'differing contributions to global environmental degradation and not in different levels of development'. 181 There is, in addition, a fundamental disagreement as to the nature of the obligation it entails. While some argue that it is obligatory, others contend that it can be nothing but discretionary. The disagreements over this principle's content and the nature of obligation it entails have spawned debates over its legal status.
182 Notwithstanding these debates, at its core the CBDR principle permits and indeed requires consideration of differential treatment between countries in the application of treaty obligations. Differential treatment is seen in a far less expansive manner in the human rights field. 183 However, a human rights approach does not necessarily preclude differential treatment. In fact, it could be argued in light of human rights concerns and the notion of thresholds (based as it is on a distinction between trivial and non-trivial climate endangering activities) that a human rights approach permits, indeed requires, albeit in a limited and contingent fashion, differential treatment between developing and industrialised countries. 184 In the post-2012 negotiations, as the CBDR principle remains First, States may and often claim differentiation for themselves through reservations. Second, treaties may use discretionary language such as 'to the maximum of its available central, 185 it would be useful to consider how a human rights approach might shape a burden sharing agreement between states that is respectful of individual rights, and of equity between and within states so as to ensure that the burden sharing arrangement does not, at least, further threaten rights protection. The issue of differentiation between developing countries, and the attempt to burden some developing countries with mitigation responsibilities might conceivably, given the additional financial burden that it will represent, risk the progressive realisation of certain rights in these countries.
The polluter pays principle
The polluter pays principle (PPP) complements the CBDR principle. This principle does not find explicit reference in the existing climate treaties, but it complements the CBDR principle insofar as the CBDR principle countenances differentiation on grounds of differing contributions to environmental harm. 186 It is also part of the conceptual apparatus of the Kyoto Protocol in that only industrialised countries, historically responsible for the majority of GHG emissions, have mitigation targets. The PPP requires that the 'polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution'. 187 Although based on intuitively sound legal ground and a logical extension of the customary international law principle that states have an obligation to 'ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control', 188 this principle does not enjoy universal support. The guarded language used in the construction of the PPP bears testimony to the caution with which states approach international responsibilities. The principle is formulated in terms which are recommendatory rather than mandatory 189 and it contains little substantive legal content. Moreover, the application of the principle, to the extent that it must be implemented 'without distorting international trade and investment' is subject to restrictive conditions. 190 Some countries have suggested that the PPP constitute one of the core principles guiding the construction of a post-2012 climate regime. 191 A human rights approach would arguably support this position. In order to ensure that climate endangering activities relating to non-trivial uses might be protected where they exist, and permitted as they grow, fossil-fuel intensive climate endangering activities in other (primarily industrialised) parts of the world that relate to 'relatively trivial interests' must first be reduced. This is essential to ensure that the progressive realisation of human rights protections proceeds unhindered in the developing world. A strict application of the PPP, however, may also undermine the progressive realisation of certain human rights in developing countries. Although historically the developed world has been responsible for the bulk of GHG emissions, emissions in developing countries, in particular in China and India, are also increasing. The PPP is not limited by capacity to pay or to historical emissions alone. Applied strictly and in isolation, China, currently considered to be emitting more than the United States, 192 would qualify as a polluter and be required to pay. 193 This in turn may divert scarce resources from nontrivial interests such as the provision of universal access to energy. The PPP therefore needs to be applied so as to complement rather than supplant principles such as the principle of CBDR.
In so far as principles such as the PPP are viewed through the prism of human rights, they require application not just between states, the classic subjects of international law, but also within states in relation to entities and individuals. There is no principled reason, if individual welfare is the focus, to distinguish between polluters within and outside the state. If polluters within corpus of international law relating to the environment. ' The precautionary principle is seen by some as evidence of a paradigm shift in international environmental law, from the ad hoc and reactive approaches that characterised early environmental regulations, to the precautionary regulation that is on the increase today. There are numerous references to the precautionary principle in international law, 196 but there are divergent views on whether the precautionary principle is properly so called, how it might best be defined, what its precise content is, what obligations it creates and on whom, and whether, in its strong version, it lends itself to actualisation. 197 As such its precise import and legal status is in much dispute. 198 The precautionary principle is purported to be in evidence in its most evolved form in the EU. The European Commission notes that the precautionary principle should be considered within a structured approach to the analysis of risk which comprises three elements: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. 199 In the Commission's view the information, 212 and education, training and public awareness. 213 The notion of cooperation is also central to the post-2012 negotiations which are titled 'long-term cooperative action under the Convention'.
In a synergistic vein, human rights doctrine also privileges international cooperation. It interprets international cooperation 'for the realization of economic, social and cultural rights' as an obligation of all States. 214 John Knox argues that the obligation to cooperate in the context of climate change should take two forms: first, in the conclusion of a Convention that effectively mitigates and ameliorates the effects of climate change on human rights; and second, in responding to the adverse effects of climate change, so as to protect human rights, in advance of an agreement. 215 Human rights provide criteria for both a successful negotiated outcome and a successful process. The negotiated outcome in the climate regimeçthe post-2012 agreementçif viewed through a human rights lens may need to ensure reduction of greenhouse gases to levels that will not interfere with the human rights of those considered most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 216 The FCCC identifies sets of countries that are traditionally considered vulnerable; 217 however, there is a range of vulnerabilities associated with climate change, and even those not traditionally considered vulnerable are likely to experience new levels of vulnerability over time. The climate negotiations are engaged in devising, through submissions of Parties, ways of recognising and responding to those considered most vulnerable. A human rights optic may serve to catalyse ambition in step with the needs of the most vulnerable.
The ambition of the regime will be reflected in the choice Parties make between different levels of GHG stabilisation (350ppm CO 2 or 450 ppm CO 2 ) or temperature increase (28Cçor less) 218 at which the international community should aim. A human rights lens, with its normative focus on the individual, may press in favour of a more rather than less ambitious outcome, given that even at the lowest levels of stabilisation and temperature increase, some groups and peoples will have their homes, livelihoods, nations and culture threatened. A human rights approach may also require that the regime provide adequate assistance to people and communities to adapt to unavoidable jurisdiction outside its own territory. 227 An extension has been suggested in the context of the right to food as well. 228 Nonetheless, the primary responsibilities of States are to those within their jurisdiction. And, this responsibility, in the case of the ICESCR, is to take stepsçdeliberate, concrete and targetedçtowards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant. 229 As discussed, many of the impacts of climate change will have serious consequences for the progressive realisation of human rights. And independent of any international agreement on climate change, states have an obligation under the relevant human rights instruments to take action both to prevent the living conditions of their nationals from falling below acceptable thresholds, and to ensure that the progressive realisation of protected rights is not impeded. The actions states are obliged to take relate to adapting to the adverse effects of climate change, and when appropriate, disaster relief.
Adaptation under the FCCC is intended to be a cooperative effort. FCCC Article 4(1)(e) read with Article 4(8) and (9) highlights the importance of cooperation and support, including support relating to funding, insurance and the transfer of technology to vulnerable developing countries. A series of international funds exist, including the recently operationalised Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, to finance adaptation in developing countries. 230 At present, however, these funds do not have the ability to generate the necessary finances. The FCCC Secretariat estimates that in 2030 additional investment and financial flows needed for adaptation will amount to several tens of billions USD, and a significant share of the additional investment and financial flowsçUSD 28^67 billionçwill be needed in developing countries. 231 Currently available finances amount to 275 million USD. 232 Efforts by developing countries to levy a charge on the entire carbon market so as to fund adaptation came to nought, cutting off another fertile source for adaptation financing. 233 The Copenhagen Accord sought to create a Green Fund, and committed developed countries to providing 30 billion USD in the 2010^12 timeframe, to be used in a balanced manner between adaptation and mitigation. 234 This fund is yet to be operationalised. The shortfall in adaptation financing will ultimately have to come from national coffers. And, this in the case of developing countries will have an impact both on their ability to contribute to mitigation efforts, as well as to lift them out of poverty.
Argentina noted in a submission to the FCCC on the post-2012 negotiations that contributions from developing countries will necessarily depend on 'striking the balance between our responsibility to our citizensçensuring they have access to minimum standards of security, human rights, and social benefits, such as food, health, education, shelter, and opportunity for selfdevelopmentçand the means available to implement mitigation activities '. 235 It is worth noting in passing that adaptation actions justified on human rights grounds may raise some doctrinal difficulties. Adaptation to climate change framed in human rights terms is in essence pre-emptive action against prospective denial of human rights. In addition to the fact that human rights theorists are wary of pre-emptive action, some may argue that the basis for prioritising rights at risk from climate impacts over other rights is unclear, as is the basis for taking pre-emptive action with respect to climate change over pre-emptive action with respect to other events that might risk a denial of human rights. An answer to this critique may lie in the core rights thesis. The rights at risk from climate impacts are core rights such as the right to life. Even if the duties that attach to these rights are purely negative, given the scale, gravity, and ferocity of the climate change problem confronting the international community, inaction on climate change adaption and mitigation will lead to rights violations.
Between States and those Subject to Another's Jurisdiction
Does a human rights optic oblige a state to adopt a certain code of conduct towards nationals of other states? Although most human rights instruments have boundaries, are there exceptional situations which might justify, indeed require, extraterritorial reach?
Climate change is likely to present international law with situations that will test its limits and expose its fault lines. One such situation is presented by the likely plight of the small island states. Entire nations, such as Maldives and Tuvalu, are likely, if current GHG emission trends continue, to be lost to sea level rise, rendering their inhabitants stateless. Tuvalu is reportedly negotiating agreements with Australia and New Zealand to move its 12,000 strong population 236 and Maldives has started saving to buy dry land to move its 400,000 strong population to India or Sri Lanka. 237 Restrictive definitions in international refugee law will preclude claims arising therein. 238 But, to the extent that forced displacement is occurring due to damage caused by climate change, primarily sourced to other's fossil-fuel intensive activities, are these nations entitled to redressçland of equal size and quality? 239 And if so, in what way? Should a State's jurisdiction be extended to encompass the impacts of a State's conduct wherever they may be felt? 240 Another situation which is likely to test the limits of international law is presented by poor states that are unable to adapt to climate change. Given that the bulk of adaptation finance will have to be raised domestically, it is entirely conceivable that poverty-stricken states will be unable to raise the finances and adapt in time. Increasingly severe impacts in such states will likely upset social stability, feed discord, and pose serious security threats that could spill over national borders. Is humanitarian intervention, albeit restrictively defined thus far, justified in such situations? Does the notion of 'responsibility to protect' applied thus far to crimes against humanity and the like, apply in situations where a population is suffering serious harm but the state is unwilling or unable to prevent it? 241 
Conclusion
Human rights approaches have the potential to bring much needed attention to individual welfare as well as to provide ethical moorings in inter-governmental climate negotiations. They offer benchmarks against which states' actions can be evaluated, the possibility of holding authorities to account, and additional criteria for the interpretation of applicable principles and obligations that states have to each other, to their own citizens, and to the citizens of other states in relation to climate change. This article has sought to provide initial insights into the numerous rights-based interventions in the climate negotiations as well as the ways in which human rights approaches may serve to influence some of the current debates in those negotiations. 240 Ibid (noting however that this takes the scope of human rights obligations well beyond the accepted jurisprudence which requires that the State exercise 'effective control' in order to be held responsible). 241 Ibid.
